Introduction
Software is the primary determinant of function in many modern engineered systems, from domestic goods such as washing machines through mass-market products such as cars to civil aircraft and nuclear power plant. In a growing number of cases the software is safety critical or safety related, i.e. failure or malfunction could give rise to, or contribute to, a fatal accident. In general, where software is a key element of a safety critical system it is developed in accordance with a set of guidelines or standards produced by the industry, or imposed by a regulator.
The civil nuclear industry makes extensive use of software, for example in control and protection systems. Many of these systems are safety critical or safety related. Software in such systems is assessed against guidelines produced by the regulators, i.e. the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate (NII) in the UK.
Standards for safety critical software vary quite considerably between industrial sectors see, for example, [1] . The purpose of this paper is consider the claims and dictates of standards and to compare these with what is achieved in practice, then to draw conclusions which it is hoped are relevant for the nuclear industry.
Standards
Software failures arise as a result of systematic (design) faults that have been introduced during software development. In recognition of this, the approach taken by many of the existing software safety standards (such as IEC61508 [2], EN50128 [3] , DO178B [4] , Def Stans 00-55 [5] and 00-56 [6] ) is to define requirements and constraints for the software development and assurance processes. By stipulating the processes to be used in the development, verification and validation of software, their intent is to reduce the number of faults introduced by the process (e.g. through increased rigour in specification), and to increase the number of faults revealed by the process (e.g. through increased rigour in verification) in order that such faults can subsequently be removed. In addition, some standards (e.g. IEC61508) go further by also recommending defensive measures (e.g. architectural strategies) to mitigate faults that may remain post-development and assurance.
Software standards dictate the degree of rigour required in software development and assurance according to the criticality of the software within the system application. The degree of rigour is typically expressed in terms of Safety Integrity Levels (SILs) or Development Assurance Levels (DALs) in the case of DO178B. In IEC61508 and EN50128, the focus is on protection systems and the SIL required is determined according the acceptable failure rate of the protection system in question. For example, in IEC61508 a requirement for SIL 3 is defined as corresponding to an equivalent failure rate range of 1 x 10 -7 to 1 x 10 -8 failures per hour of continuous operation. In DO178B and Def Stan 00-56, DAL and SIL (respectively) are determined according to the worst-case severity of the system hazard to which failure of the software can contribute, together with some consideration of the extent of possible mitigation external to the software. In the civil aerospace domain acceptable failure rates are also determined by hazard severity. Therefore implicitly there is a correspondence between DALs and acceptable failure rate targets. For example, the requirement of DAL A corresponds to a failure rate requirement of 1 x 10 -9 per flying hour.
Having determined the overall SIL required, the standards define (typically, by lifecycle phase) the recommended techniques and processes for software development and assurance. For example, Def Stan 00-56 [6] states that "Informal" Requirements and Design Specification are considered acceptable for the lower integrity levels, i.e. SIL 1 and SIL 2, "Semi-formal" techniques are admissible for SIL 3, and "Formal (Mathematical)" specification techniques are expected for the highest level of integrity, i.e. SIL 4. Whilst the overall approach is common, there are often differences in the specific processes and techniques recommended by different standards. For example, Def Stan 00-55 emphasises the use of formal verification techniques for the highest integrity level, whilst DO178B concentrates on human review and rigorous testing.
Standards differ as to whether a corresponding failure rate can be associated with software developed to a specific integrity level. Def Stan 00-56 advocates the approach of determining claim limits for each Safety Integrity Level that defines the minimum (i.e. best) failure rate that can be claimed for a function or component of that level, irrespective of its calculated random failure probability. Whilst the standard expresses the desire that these claim limits should be based on actual operational experience, it provides an example set of limits that can be used in the absence of other data. For example, the corresponding claim limit for SIL 3 is defined as 1 x 10 -6 failures per hour. DO178B takes a different view by stating that, "development of software to a software level does not imply the assignment of a failure rate for the software". In the next section we will discuss the failure rates achieved in practice by industry where they have followed the requirements of the different safety standards.
For a more extensive discussion of the commonalities and differences amongst safety standards we refer the reader to [7] .
Industry Data
It is difficult to obtain industrial data, partly because it is commercially sensitive, and partially because the data is not often collected systematically. In this section we indicate what we believe is typically achieved in industrial projects, based on published data where possible, and on sanitised commercial material we have gleaned from a range of sources, where the material is not in the public domain.
Fault Density
There is a general consensus in some areas of the safety critical systems community that a fault density of about 1 per kLoC is world class. Some software, e.g. that for the Space Shuttle [8] , is rather better but fault densities of lower than 0.1 per kLoC are exceptional. The UK MoD funded the retrospective static analysis of the C130J software, previously developed to DO178B, and determined that it contained about 1.4 safety critical faults per kLoC (the overall flaw density was around 23 per kLoC, see below for more details). It is worthwhile making some observations. First, whilst a fault density of 1 per kLoC may seem high it is worth noting that commercial software is around 30 faults per kLoC, with initial fault injection rates of over 100 per kLoC.
Second, not all faults are equal and with a typical safety critical development all known safety critical faults will be removed, and only those of lower importance, e.g. usability or performance issues, will remain. This is because, when changing code, there is a risk that a new fault will be introduced, so a judgement is made whether or not making a modification is likely to reduce risk.
Third, faults are generally data sensitive, e.g. the code will work correctly on most data, but certain values will give rise to problems. This might be, for example, because of a "divide by zero" or a fault in an algorithm (perhaps represented as a data table, where one of the entries is incorrect), or inappropriate initialisation when the system is restarted under unusual circumstances.
Failure Rates
Failure rate data is more difficult to come by than information on fault density. First we make some estimates of dangerous failure rates in two industries.
Ellims [9] has produced an interesting analysis of software in the automotive industry. Most automotive accidents are due to drivers. The majority of those accidents which have technical causes are due to mechanical failure. There is no data on what proportion of accidents with technical roots are caused by software.
However, some estimates can be made using recall data. Less than 0.1% of vehicle recalls are software related, further some of these may be using software to rectify other faults, e.g. mechanical deficiencies. However assuming that all these were corrections of hazardous failures, Ellims has estimated that, at worst, 5 deaths and 300 injuries per annum in the UK are attributable to software in vehicles. Assuming that there are 5M vehicles on the road, driven for 300 hours per annum on average, this amounts to about 0.2 x 10 -6 failures causing injury or death per hour.
The figure considered "per system" is probably lower, as there are several computerbased systems in modern vehicles. Thus it would seem that the industry currently achieves better than 10 -6 per hour, perhaps around 10 -7 per hour, for those failures causing failures causing injury or death.
Similarly, the civil aircraft industry has almost no fatal accidents which are attributed to software (although there are many accidents). At present there are around 14,000 civil aircraft worldwide, with a total of about 18 million flights (the industry uses the term departures) between them per annum. The average loss rate is about 1.4 per million departures. Assuming an average flight length of 5 hours this gives a fatal accident rate of about 0.3 x 10 -6 per hour.
As with the automotive industry, the majority of accidents are attributed to human error, or to mechanical failure. On the other hand, there are many software upgrades on aircraft systems which may indicate that changes were made following incidents which, in other circumstances, could have given rise to accidents. However even if 1 in 3 accidents had software as a partial cause, this still gives 10 -7 per hour fatal accident rate from software causes. An analysis by Shooman [10] of software fault correction for avionics systems also gives a figure on about 10 -7 per hour.
As with the automotive industry, if the data is apportioned amongst systems, the failure rate becomes even lower. There are typically about 40 computerised systems on a modern aircraft -although not all of these systems can, of themselves, cause aircraft loss.
Finally, note that the underlying software failure rate will be much higher than the accident rates quoted here, as not all software failures will give rise to accidents.
Observations
This operational data suggests that, in mature industries, safety critical software has a comparatively low failure rate, and is not a major contributor to accidents. However this positive view should be tempered with the observations that there are many more nuisance failures than hazardous ones, and that software is growing in complexity and authority. Thus, although the current situation is quite positive, it cannot be assumed that it will remain this way.
Predicting Failure Rates
Even if software has a low failure rate in practice, we are still left with the difficulty of predicting failure rates before we deploy software.
There are several reasons why it is difficult to demonstrate the failure rate of software, in advance. The most basic problem arises from the low failure rates which need to be demonstrated.
First, it has long been accepted that it is not practical to experimentally quantify the failure rate of safety critical software, to show that it meets such a target. Ignoring for the moment issues of statistical confidence, 10 9 hours amounts to roughly 114,000 years -which is clearly impractical as a test period prior to deployment. Butler and Finelli [11] produced the first publication which clearly stated this difficulty, but others, e.g. Littlewood and Strigini [12] , have reached similar conclusions. Thus it is accepted that direct attempts to quantify rates of occurrence of hazardous failure modes for software are infeasible. (This is true even where there are no failures. If software has executed for N hours without failure, and all we know is that it has been tested randomly, then there is only a 50% chance that it will execute for the next N hours without failure.)
In general, the safety critical software community seem to accept that a failure rate of about 10 -3 to 10 -4 per hour can be demonstrated prior to release to service, via statistical testing, but that higher failure rates cannot be shown this way -although clearly the operational data says that they can be achieved.
There have been several attempts to circumvent this problem, still within classical statistics. Some have considered reliability growth, i.e. how reliability improves over time with fault removal, but this still suffers from the limits alluded to above.
Second, it is unclear how to relate flaw density to failure rate. There is evidence of a fairly strong correlation for systems such as programmable logic controllers (PLCs) [13] . This correlation can be used produce a stochastic model of functional failure. If this model were general it would be possible to predict failure rate from flaw density.
On the basis of the stochastic model of functional failure, the mean time to software failure can be shown to be approximately proportional to T/N, where T is the time spent testing and debugging and N is the number of systematic faults in the software. Therefore, if it is possible to halve the number of faults N this will approximately double the reliability. Similarly, doubling the time T, spent on testing, will also approximately double the reliability, provided all failures are correctly diagnosed and fixed. Note that it is still necessary to have a long testing time and a small number of faults to get an MTBF in the order of 1,000 or 10,000 hours.
In general, however, the correlation will depend on where the flaws are in the program and the typical "trajectory" through the program. Consider mass market software such as Windows. There are about 35 MLoC in Windows XP. If the typical figure of 30 faults per kLoC applies, then this is just over 1 M faults -yet Windows reliability has grown from about 300 hours MTBF with 95/98 to about 3,000 hours with the current generation of systems [8] (although the software size and thus, presumably, the number of faults has grown). Assuming that there are 100 million PCs in the world running 1,000 hours per annum (5 hours per day, 200 days per year) this gives 100 billion operating hours per annum. The above T/N formula would give an MTBF of about 100,000 hours not 3,000 hours. This suggests that faults have a non-uniform distribution, and that the T/N formula does not apply well for complex products. Other data supports this view.
Thus it is hard to infer operational failure rates before entry in to service. On a simple statistical basis it is hard to get beyond 10 -3 to 10 -4 per hour, and there seems to be no practical way of inferring failure rate from fault density. Although the T/N formula is attractive, it does not readily take us past the 10 -3 to 10 -4 per hour figure, and it is unclear that it applies to complex software.
Achievement and Prediction
It is instructive to relate the standards and industrial practice to compare what we can achieve, with what we can predict.
Achievement
Safety critical software, in service, has low hazardous failure rates. From the data quoted it contributes to accidents at a rate of around 10 -6 to 10 -7 per hour, although it must be stressed that this data is approximate. In terms of the figures used in the standards reviewed the achieved rates are roughly:
• IEC 61508 -SIL 3
• DO 178B -DAL B
• DS 00-56 -SIL 3
• EN 50129 [14] -SIL 1 EN 50129 is the railway standard which sets SIL targets, and hence the context for the software requirements in EN 50128. It should be noted that IEC 61508, DS 00-56 and DO178B are broadly in line with one another -the achieved rates fall into the second highest SIL or DAL, whereas the railway standards view the failure rate achievements as being SIL 1.
Of course, in this data, the failure rate of the software itself could be higher than quoted as the accidents relate to those unsafe failures which are not mitigated. On the other hand, assuming that all software recalls for cars or aircraft are to fix a hazardous software defect seems rather pessimistic. Thus, although these figures cannot be taken as firm, there is evidence that high SIL/DAL levels are achieved, except in the railway interpretation of these concepts.
It is, of course, accepted that there are significant levels of nuisance failures in the industries surveyed, but we should not let this stop us from recognising that these figures show that the number of unsafe failures, caused by software, is very low.
Note that the processes we have referred to do not generally employ static analysis, so these failure rates are achieved without complying with the requirements of the highest SILs in DS 00-56 and IEC61508. There is some evidence that formal techniques, e.g. static analysis, do find faults, although there is no easy way of quantifying the benefits.
Prediction
In some senses, the most difficult problem is one of prediction. Statistically it is not reasonable to claim better than about 10 -3 to 10 -4 per hour, on the basis of preoperational testing. Thus we cannot predict with confidence the failure rates we can achieve -indeed the gap is significant, at around three orders of magnitude.
Some attempts have been made to overcome this "prediction gap", e.g. by use of Bayesian Belief Networks (BBNs) [15] . However, whilst the BBN models which are produced often seem compelling qualitatively, or structurally, quantitatively they depend on expert judgement on how the factors in the models combine (technically these are conditional probability tables at the nodes in the BBNs). It is difficult to see how to validate this expert judgement, in numerical terms, although generally the qualitative relationships, e.g. that the use of static analysis helps to reduce fault density, are much easier to validate.
Software in Nuclear Plant
We understand that the NII is reluctant to accept claims beyond 10 -2 per annum or (1.14 x) 10 -6 per hour for systems containing software. It is instructive to review this position, in the light of the above data.
A Dilemma
Put simply, the above analysis seems to show we can achieve the sorts of failure rates we require for safety critical software -at least for SIL 3 systems -without the use of static analysis, but we simply cannot show it in advance. Further, the operational times need to show that SIL 4 systems meet their targets is very longand probably only attainable in mass market products such as cars. The best avionics system we are aware of has operated for about 25 million hours without unsafe failure, i.e. with a failure rate of about 4 x 10 -8 per hour at 50% confidence, but it is now getting towards the end of its life! Given the above analysis, we seem to have two options:
• Do not accept failure rate claims for software better than 10 -4 per hour, the lowest rate which can realistically be shown by statistical testing, unless and until the software is proven in service;
• Accept failure rate claims as low as 10 -7 per hour, so long as good processes have been used, and there is no contrary evidence, i.e. no failures in testing which would reveal faults if the software didn't meet at least 10 -3 per hour.
The first option is the most "scientifically defensible" -indeed Issue 3 of DS 00-56 says it is the preferred form of argument. However the second option would allow operators to gain benefit from using software at the "cost" of using an argument which extrapolates beyond available data.
Thus there is a dilemma. If we stick to the "scientifically defensible" approach then the risk of failure of the software that is deployed will be low -but this may mean that desirable functions or capabilities are not provided, and may therefore increase risk at the whole plant level. Alternatively, if extrapolation beyond demonstrated failure rates is allowed there is a greater risk that the deployed software will fail in service, possibly in an unsafe manner, and the safety argument is intrinsically weaker as we are making arguments about a specific system, based on general observations about the class of safety critical software. Both approaches have drawbacks, and neither is really attractive.
A Third Way?
It can be argued that the "core" of the above dilemma is the approach to the whole problem. SILs are a "blunt instrument", and several analyses, e.g. by Fowler [16] and Redmill [17] , have shown that the "logic of SILs" does not always stand up to scrutiny when applied to particular systems. There is a possible "third way" -provide safety arguments based on the failure modes of concern, not the "blunt instrument" of SILs.
Starting at the system level, it may be possible to show that we can afford a fairly high fairly rate, say 10 -3 per hour for a smart sensor, because the system uses high levels of redundancy (indeed it is likely that availability will be a greater driver than safety). In this case the most difficult issue is likely to be common mode failuresand SILs don't seem to help with that at all. If we can produce system arguments which are defensible given such failure rates, then black box testing or in-service data should provide sufficient evidence.
If such arguments are not tenable, and we need to show that much more stringent failure rates are met, then there may be benefit from analysing specific failure modes. Consider again the case of a smart sensor. The critical failure modes may be plausible but wrong data, or slow drift (to give plausible but wrong data). Evidence that these failure modes do not arise would come from analysis of the design or software itself, in this case considering numerical accuracy of algorithms, including possible drift in numerical integrators. An argument focused on such issues would give direct evidence of safety, rather than the indirect argument based on SILs. Of course, some "backing evidence" is needed to show that the results of the analysis apply to the software as delivered, that it is properly scheduled, and so on, but these arguments and the supporting evidence focus directly on the safety properties of concern, rather than being a very indirect argument about "SIL".
In other words, the "third way" is to extend the safety arguments and safety case down to the level of software, and specific software failure modes [18] . SILs are probably still useful as a guide, especially to managing the development process, but would not form part of the safety case which, instead, would be focused on the particular failure modes of interest.
Conclusions
Software is currently an important element of many safety critical systems, and the trend is towards greater dependence on software. In some cases, this greater dependency reflects a desire to increase capability; in other cases it is simply due to the infeasibility of avoiding software, e.g. where so-called "smart sensors" have replaced "dumb" ones.
There has been some concern over the use of software in safety critical applications, but the available evidence suggests that software has not been a major contributor to accidents, in the aerospace and automotive sectors, and unsafe failure rates of about 10 -6 to 10 -7 per hour have been achieved in such applications. This failure rate corresponds to SIL 3 in IEC61508, or DAL B in DO 178B. These low failure rates have been achieved without the use of static analysis, although there is empirical evidence that static analysis techniques do reveal faults in software. This suggests that static analysis has a role from the point of view of achieved integrity at the SIL 4/DAL A, but it is hard to justify on these grounds at lower integrity levels. Static analysis may be cost-effective at lower integrity levels, but there are limited data points to support such an assertion (see [19] for an example).
A problem however exists with prediction; statistical techniques are insufficient to "prove" a failure rate of better than 10 -3 to 10 -4 per hour prior to deployment of the system. If pre-operational claims were limited to what can be shown by testing, then this would severely limit the classes of system which could be developed and deployed, as operational achievement is around three orders of magnitude better than can be shown via testing. On the other hand, just appealing to the process and saying that "SIL X achieves a failure rate of better than Y" is not compelling.
One possible alternative approach is to move away from simple reliance on SILs and to analyse systems and software to show that particular failure modes of concern, e.g. plausible but erroneous data values, cannot arise. In other words, it would be possible to extend the safety argument and safety case to deal explicitly with software. There is some move in this direction, e.g. for ground-based systems in the civil aerospace sector, and in Issue 3 of Def Stan 00-56 which is due to be released in September 2004.
In summary, despite around 30 years of experience in using software in safety related and safety critical systems we do not have consensus on what can be achieved with software, how best to achieve it, nor on how to "prove" what has been achieved. It is therefore likely that software in safety critical systems will remain a contentious issue for some time to come and it may be that there is a major shift in approach, e.g. towards goal-based standards, and reduced reliance on prescriptive standards. There certainly seems to be merit in keeping an open mind, and being prepared to accept a range of arguments for demonstrating system and software safety, rather than sticking dogmatically to the prescriptions of any standard.
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